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New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, 
and Timor-Leste are not reviewed in 
this issue. 
Fiji
Fiji’s vulnerability to climate change 
was tested throughout 2016 with 
cyclones, the most powerful being 
Severe Tropical Cyclone Winston on 
20 January 2016. Winston was the 
strongest cyclone ever recorded in 
the history of Fiji or the South Pacific 
Basin. This category five cyclone left 
forty-four people dead and at least 
thirty-five thousand people homeless 
in Fiji (Fiji Sun Online 2016; Thack-
ray 2016).
Recovery efforts have been slow. 
At the beginning of 2017, almost a 
year after Winston, tents were still 
being used in parts of Fiji for hous-
ing and for schools. The devastation 
has added not only to the Fiji govern-
ment’s ongoing financial burdens but 
also to its long-term responsibilities to 
mitigate the impacts of climate change 
in the country. Recently, changing 
weather patterns have produced new 
problems in Fiji requiring urgent 
solutions. For instance, after Winston 
destroyed so many buildings and 
homes, it was realized that most were 
structurally weak and unable to with-
stand such mega-storms. 
From the colonial period on, a 
significant percentage of Fiji’s popu-
lation has remained in rural villages 
or, increasingly, on the peripher-
ies of urban centers. But also since 
the colonial period, governments 
have had very little involvement in 
regulating where people live and the 
types of structures people occupy in 
these areas. This is partly a legacy 
of the colonial practice of “indirect 
rule,” whereby Fijian chiefs ruled 
their  people on behalf of the colonial 
administrators. Villagers were not 
really taught to develop their resources 
for economic benefit but rather 
continued to live subsistence or semi-
subsistence lifestyles. This arrange-
ment was still very much the same in 
2016, but with some changes in the 
administrative system. Village bylaws 
did not include strict housing regula-
tions. Those who have money to do so 
can build safe houses; others can only 
afford very basic shelters.
Nonindigenous and indigenous 
Fijians who wanted to live closer to 
urban areas but cannot afford to pay 
rent have ended up in squatter settle-
ments around the peripheries. Housing 
in these areas often does not adhere to 
any government-approved standard 
(see Fiji Government 2011). However, 
increasing climate change–related 
emergencies such as cyclones and 
flooding have amplified the govern-
ment’s responsibility to implement 
new building standards to safeguard 
people from the devastating impacts of 
natural disasters. 
While the Fiji government has been 
active in its attempt to help people 
to rebuild, perhaps the main chal-
lenge for its Climate Change Unit is 
to ensure that these new structures are 
able to withstand drastic cyclones and 
flooding. The Climate Change Unit 
has already relocated some villages 
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due to the direct impact of climate 
change in some areas in Fiji (Chandra 
2015).
Another challenge, evolving since 
1987, is linked with Fiji’s political 
economy and stalled development 
issues due to recurring coups. Four 
coups in the small island state have 
had ongoing and long-term socio-
political and economic impacts on the 
government’s priorities. Each post-
coup military government, from 1987 
to 2006, has been concerned less with 
looking after people than with finan-
cially securing military rule through 
such policies as increasing the military 
budget (Durutalo 2016, 106). Devel-
opment gaps exposed after the cyclone 
were partially filled by aid donors.
After Tropical Cyclone Winston, 
Fiji received initial international 
contributions for rebuilding from 
New Zealand and Australia. Despite 
her tough stand against these two 
neighbors following the 2006 military 
coup, Fiji readily accepted their aid 
packages, which included military 
personnel to help with the rebuilding. 
Additional assistance poured into Fiji 
from the international community 
including France, India, Japan, the 
People’s Republic of China, the United 
States, and regional countries such as 
French Polynesia, Tonga, and Nauru. 
Assistance was also received from 
international financial institutions 
like the Asian Development Bank and 
international humanitarian organiza-
tions like the Red Cross (Fiji Govern-
ment 2016). 
The Red Cross has been particu-
larly active in helping Fiji to rebuild, 
despite a shortage of builders and 
building materials. One year after 
Winston, Fiji Red Cross has helped 
seventy-seven thousand people with 
emergency needs. Besides rebuilding 
some of the schools destroyed by the 
storm, Fiji Red Cross has also “pro-
vided communities with clean water, 
emotional support to help people 
process the trauma of the emergency 
and its aftermath, [and] information 
on health risks” (ifrc 2017). 
A major contribution by Fiji Red 
Cross, in partnership with the Inter-
national Federation of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies (ifrc), 
has been the rebuilding “safer and 
stronger homes that are more resis-
tant to future cyclones.” As explained 
by Filipe Nainoca, director of Fiji 
Red Cross: “Through our Build Back 
Safer programme we design and 
build demonstration houses that are 
built to withstand severe storms. We 
have also trained more than 60 local 
carpenters who have taken their skills 
back to their villages” (ifrc 2017). 
Red Cross rebuilding efforts in Fiji 
are quite advanced in local com-
munities, not only teaching people 
how to build stronger homes but also 
how to safeguard freshwater springs 
from contamination. Red Cross 
Cyclone Winston recovery efforts in 
Fiji will continue through May 2017 
(ifrc 2017). 
In January 2016, prior to the 
arrival of Winston in the Fiji group, 
Moscow’s export to the Fiji military 
forces had already arrived at Suva’s 
Kings Wharf. The export reflected 
Fiji’s new (post–2006 military coup) 
foreign policy focus on “looking to 
Moscow.” The load of twenty-five 
sealed containers that were taken to 
the Queen Elizabeth Army Barracks 
in Nabua under heavy military guard 
was described by the Fiji govern-
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ment newspaper, the Fiji Sun, as an 
“Arms Boost from Russia” (Bolatiki 
2016). The containers held “Russian 
weapons, ammunition and vehicles” 
(The Economist 2016), which were to 
be used by Fijian soldiers on inter-
national peacekeeping duties in the 
Sinai  desert in Egypt and in the Golan 
Heights, near the Israel and Syrian 
borders. 
This deal was brokered in 2013 
between Fiji Prime Minister Voreqe 
Bainimarama and Russian Prime 
 Minister Dmitry Medvedev and came 
into clear view in 2014 when Fiji 
abstained from voting against  Russia 
in the United Nations on Russia’s 
bid to annex Crimea (The Economist 
2016). This is the usual price paid for 
political favors or aid by small, vulner-
able Island states that have nothing to 
offer their big rich friends but votes in 
the United Nations.
Reacting to the “Russian delivery,” 
Opposition members of Parliament 
claimed that the Russian military 
weapons had entered Fiji illegally, 
without proper authorization by 
the police. Additionally, some even 
claimed that arms were bought for the 
purpose of “threatening the opposi-
tion” (The Economist 2016). 
Between 1987 and 2016, suppress-
ing opposition to government has been 
more conspicuous and the militariza-
tion of the state more pronounced. 
Military control of police and other 
institutions of the state has been ongo-
ing since the 1987 military coups and 
includes the appointment of army offi-
cers to serve as diplomats in overseas 
missions, in senior civil service posi-
tions, and as police commissioners. 
For instance, in 1992, after serv-
ing as a diplomat, Isikia Savua, a 
high-ranking military officer, was 
appointed as police commissioner. 
After the 2000 and the 2006 military 
coups, other army officers became 
diplomats and police commission-
ers. Sitiveni Qiliho, former Land 
Force commander in the Fiji Military 
Forces (who was also linked with 
army brutality after the 2006 coup), 
is the current police commissioner. He 
replaced Fiji’s former commissioner of 
police, Ben  Groenewald, who resigned 
after alleging military intervention in 
police work. Groenewald completed 
an investigation into the beating of 
several prison escapees by police 
officers. Three of the police officers 
who were charged in the beating were 
subsequently recruited to join the 
army (abc News 2015). 
Fiji’s ongoing attempts to revali-
date and reinterpret the rule of law 
to suit certain agenda pose a chal-
lenge to the legal system. Two written 
constitutions—the 1990 one after 
Sitiveni Rabuka’s 1987 coup and the 
2013 version after Bainimarama’s 
2006 coup—included “Immunity 
Decrees” pardoning all those who 
took part in the military coups and 
the illegal  overthrow of two elected 
governments (see Constitution of the 
Sovereign Democratic Republic of Fiji 
1990, chapter 14; Constitution of the 
Republic of Fiji 2013, chapter 10). 
Between June and September 2016, 
two Opposition members of Parlia-
ment—Tupou Draunidalo from the 
National Federation Party (nfp) and 
Ratu Isoa Tikoca from the Social 
Democratic Liberal Party (sodelpa)—
were suspended indefinitely from 
Fiji’s Parliament (rnz 2016a, 2016e). 
They joined another Opposition 
member of Parliament, Ratu Naiqama 
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 Lalabalavu, also from sodelpa, who 
had been suspended in 2015 for two 
years (rnz 2015a). The decision by 
the Inter-Parliamentary Union (ipu) to 
lift the two more recent suspensions 
was ignored by the Fiji government 
(rnz 2016b). The nfp’s Draunidalo 
has since resigned from Parliament. 
The nfp leader, Professor Biman 
Prasad, stated that penalties and sanc-
tions must be based on the exercise of 
reason. He added that Draunidalo’s 
suspension showed the oversensitiv-
ity of the Fiji First party, currently 
in power, to any form of criticism 
directed against them (rnz 2016a). 
By June 2016, leadership reshuffles 
in sodelpa saw the return of Sitiveni 
Rabuka, former coup leader in 1987 
and prime minister from 1992 to 
1999, as new party leader (rnz 
2016d). This caused some conflict 
in the party, as some members did 
not want a former coup leader to 
head sodelpa (rnz 2016c).  Others 
consider Rabuka to be the only person 
who can beat Bainimarama in the 
2018 elections, given Rabuka’s mili-
tary background and history as a coup 
leader–turned–prime minister (Delai-
batiki 2016).
In September 2016, five prominent 
opposition politicians were interro-
gated for twenty-four hours in Suva’s 
Central Police Station. The group 
included nfp leader Biman Prasad, 
sodelpa leader Sitiveni Rabuka, 
General Secretary of Fiji Council of 
Trade Unions Attar Singh, former 
politician Professor Tupeni Baba, and 
Jone Dakuvula from the nongovern-
mental organization Pacific Dialogue. 
flp leader Mahendra Chaudhry also 
handed himself in for interrogation 
when he returned to Suva. A week 
prior to the interrogations, they 
were part of a group that attended 
a public forum organized by Pacific 
Dialogue on Fiji’s 2013 Constitu-
tion (abc News 2016). Despite the 
fact that the group was later released 
without any charges, their case files 
were handed over to the director of 
public  prosecution for review (Tahana 
2016). This incident triggered discus-
sion and concern among Fijians about 
what some saw as a heavy-handed 
response by the government. This is a 
sign that politics in Fiji is still a work 
in  progress.
Fiji’s coup culture has also brought 
with it a lot of institutional violence, 
leading to severe harm and even death 
at the hands of local and national 
security forces. In October 2016, 
Prime Minister Bainimarama, Attor-
ney General Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum, 
and Police Commissioner Qiliho 
expressed a political commitment to 
end torture and ill-treatment of people 
in Fiji. This was a follow-up to Fiji’s 
ratification of the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
in March 2016 (Amnesty International 
2016, 4). 
An Amnesty International Report 
released in Fiji in 2016 provided an 
in-depth analysis of brutality at the 
hands of the security forces between 
2012 and 2016. Some of the stories 
were unknown to Fijians in Fiji due 
to continued censorship through the 
2010 Media Industry Development 
Decree, which is still in effect (rnz 
2015b). As explained in the report, a 
huge problem also relates to “the lack 
of independent oversight and near-
impunity for such crimes increases the 
risks of torture and other ill-treatment 
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occurring. The police are effectively 
left to police themselves, and the 
military has interfered with policing 
investigations where it involves mili-
tary officers as alleged perpetrators” 
(Amnesty International 2016, 5). 
The Amnesty International report 
also highlighted that “the Commis-
sioner of Police, Commissioner of 
Corrections and Commander of the 
Royal Fiji Military Forces (all senior 
military officers) have the discretion 
to appoint, remove and discipline 
their own officers and report to the 
 Minister of National Security and 
Defence” (Amnesty International 
2016, 5), who is usually a former 
 military officer. Given the political 
culture of militarization and state 
violence in Fiji, it is  difficult to ensure 
transparency, justice, and the protec-
tion of human rights.
In summary, natural and political 
problems confronted Fiji through-
out 2016. Climate change challenges 
through tropical cyclones and flooding 
exposed Fiji’s geographical vulnerabil-
ities. A year after the natural disasters, 
new developmental issues like meeting 
building standards and a shortage of 
building materials continue to delay 
rebuilding efforts.
As seen in 2016, the government 
has been swift in clamping down on 
meetings they consider subversive or 
as posing a threat to the administra-
tion. Repressive edicts, such as the 
Media Industry Development Decree, 
underscore the problems with the 
 government in power. Freedom of 
speech and freedom of expression 
continue to be eroded. 
Fiji’s current political problems 
did not emerge overnight and they 
continue to evolve. The Amnesty 
International report draws attention to 
critical issues of justice and the exer-
cise of the rule of law. The report also 
stresses the need for systemic change 
within the security forces and a com-
mitment to safeguarding human rights 
(2016, 29).
alumita l durutalo
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Papua
At the end of 2014, thanks to the 
strong commitment of Vanuatu’s 
elders, Papuan leaders signed the 
Saralana Declaration that served 
as the basis to establish the United 
Liberation Movement for West Papua 
(ulmwp) in Vanuatu. This step 
symbolized the unification of Papuan 
leadership, which includes the Federal 
Republic of West Papua (frwp), the 
West Papua National Coalition of 
Liberation (wpncl), and the National 
Parliament for West Papua (npwp). 
Since then, the umbrella organization 
has become the rising star in repre-
senting the Papuan resistance move-
ments at international fora, especially 
in the Pacific region. 
Five Papuan leaders from differ-
ent generations and time zones were 
unanimously appointed to run the 
secretariat: Octo Mote, Benny Wenda, 
Leonie Tanggahma, Rex  Rumakiek, 
and Jacob Rumbiak. Despite an 
 ongoing struggle within the organiza-
tion over leadership, challenges are 
not being lodged against these indi-
viduals personally. Rather, the leader 
of the frwp, Forkorus Yaboisembut, 
questions the legitimacy of the ulmwp 
to represent Papua as a nation, even 
though his organization signed the 
declaration. He claims that only the 
frwp holds the status of a state and 
thus has the legitimacy to deal with 
Indonesia as an equal. 
While the claim remains 
 unresolved, it does not hinder the 
operations of ulmwp in representing 
Papua at international fora. In 2015, 
the ulmwp gained further historic 
momentum when it was granted 
observer status at the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group (msg), a subregional 
diplomatic forum. This status signi-
fies the first international recognition 
of Papua as a political entity and has 
 galvanized grassroots support both 
inside and outside Papua. 
Developments in the Pacific have 
profoundly reshaped relations not 
only between Indonesia and the Pacific 
but, more broadly, between the Pacific 
and the rest of the world. Pacific 
nations have become much more 
assertive in expressing their identi-
ties and interests. They are aware of 
their potential as key players in the 
region and are able to negotiate with 
major regional and global players, 
such as Australia, China, and the 
United States, to promote their own 
national interest. For instance, despite 
its exclusion from the Pacific Island 
Forum by Australia and New Zealand, 
Fiji managed to surmount its isolation 
and secure a presence at one of the 
most prestigious United Nations (UN) 
fora by chairing the g-77 (Group of 
Seventy-Seven Developing Countries) 
in 2013 (regarding Fiji’s more recent 
international leadership roles, see Nic 
Maclellan’s review of issues and events 
in the region, this issue).
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Within the msg, New Caledonia 
and Bougainville have raised agenda 
items concerning their rights to self-
determination in relation to France 
and Papua New Guinea, respectively. 
In 2018 New Caledonia will hold a 
referendum on self-determination, 
with two other votes possible up to 
2022 (Maclellan 2016, 278–279), 
and in 2019 Bougainville will decide 
whether to separate from or remain 
with Papua New Guinea (abc 2016). 
Thus the geopolitics of the Pacific may 
become more dynamic over the next 
five years as national boundaries are 
possibly redrawn.
This context is necessary to 
 understand developments in Papua 
over the last two years. The rise of 
the Papua issue is not a single and 
isolated event. Rather, it is rooted in 
a broader trend of emerging power 
on the part of Pacific nations as 
well as the dynamics of Indonesia’s 
 democracy.
If ulmwp is Papua’s rising star on 
the international scene, the Komite 
Nasional Papua Barat (knpb, the 
West Papua National Committee) and 
the Aliansi Mahasiswa Papua (Papua 
Students Alliance) are the two game 
changers at the domestic level. These 
two Papuan youth organizations share 
the common agenda of self-deter-
mination for Papua. Mis interpreted 
by Brussels-based think tank Inter-
national Crisis Groups as “radical” 
 (Hernawan 2010), knpb takes the 
lead in mobilizing the Papuan  grass 
roots to take to the streets expressing 
their support for the ulmwp. Inside 
Papua, knpb organizes peaceful rallies 
in  Jayapura, Wamena, and Dekay. 
Outside Papua, the major Indonesian 
cities of Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Manado, 
 Semarang, and Denpasar have become 
hubs for their rallies. 
In contrast to other mass demon-
strations such as the self-proclaimed 
“Defending Islam” marches in Jakarta, 
the police have exhibited zero toler-
ance for Papuan rallies. Despite Indo-
nesia’s constitutional guarantees of 
freedom of assembly, association, and 
expression of opinion for all citizens 
and residents, authorities have not 
hesitated to resort to excessive force to 
disperse, arbitrarily arrest, and detain 
Papuan demonstrators. The Jakarta 
Legal Aid Institute has documented 
that more than 4,500 Papuan men 
and women were arbitrarily arrested 
and detained for less than twenty-four 
hours between January and August 
2016 for taking to the streets to 
express their political views in thirteen 
cities across the country (lbh Jakarta 
2016). As the police acted simultane-
ously in those cities, we can conclude 
that such massive and simultaneous 
police deployment involving massive 
resources and personnel across juris-
dictions would have not been possible 
without orders from the top. 
The use of excessive force caused 
serious casualties among Papuan 
students in Jakarta and Yogyakarta, 
as documented by the Jakarta and 
Yogyakarta Legal Aid Institutes, 
respectively (lbh Jakarta 2016; lbh 
Yogyakarta 2016). However, police 
repression has not deterred Papuan 
youth from continuing to express their 
political views in the public arena; on 
the contrary, it seems to only fuel the 
militancy of the Papuan youth and 
their supporters across Indonesia. 
Police brutality, on the other hand, 
continues with impunity. No police 
officer has been held accountable 
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for alleged human rights abuses that 
caused serious injury to students, as 
the National Commission on Human 
Rights (Komnas ham) publicly stated 
(Satuharapan.com 2016). The reality 
is unchecked police repression in the 
name of protecting public order. 
The ulmwp, however, is not 
the only game in town. Indigenous 
Papuans have also confronted the 
encroaching operations of extractive 
industries in many parts of Papua. For 
instance, Southern Papua struggles 
with Merauke Integrated Food and 
Energy Estate, Paniai with artisanal 
gold mine and palm-oil projects that 
threaten the environment, Keerom 
with palm-oil plantations, Bintuni Bay 
with hosting Tangguh liquid natural 
gas project, and, last but not least, 
Mimika continues to confront the five-
decade-old problem of Freeport mine 
operations that destroy the Mimika 
landscape. 
The Pusaka Foundation, a Jakarta-
based nongovernmental organization, 
has documented the ongoing disputes 
over land between the local communi-
ties and three major palm-oil com-
panies in Southern Papua: the South 
Korean corporation Korindo Group, 
the Menara Group, and the Malaysian 
corporation Tadmax Group. These 
corporations control 6,503 square 
kilometers of land combined, which is 
nearly ten times larger than the land 
area of Jakarta (661.52 square kilo-
meters). The size of the land clearly 
represents the enormous power of the 
investors because it covers one-fourth 
of the Boven Digoel regency. Korindo 
alone secured the lease for over 1,596 
square kilometers of land from the 
Indonesian Ministry of Forestry.
Based on its lease, Korindo has 
not hesitated to clear the ground by 
burning the tropical forest not only 
of Papua but also of North Maluku. 
In 2016 the Pusaka Foundation and 
its partners documented that the 
company contributed to Indonesia’s 
haze disaster, although the company 
denied this charge (Mighty and others 
2016). In total, Korindo contributed 
to the deforestation of five hundred 
square kilometers of primary forest 
(more than twice the size of Sydney, 
for instance). We can imagine the 
immediate and long-term impacts of 
this extensive palm-oil operation on 
Papuan livelihoods, communities, and 
ecologies.
While I was conducting research 
in the area in November 2016, a 
landowner expressed his feelings to 
me: “I don’t want to accept [compen-
sation] because the forest has gone 
and so too have animals, wood, and 
rattan. The climate has changed. 
We can’t use creeks anymore. The 
air is dirty.” Korindo activities have 
 dramatically degraded the environ-
ment, which is now inaccessible to 
the locals. The company also caused 
 factions within the affected commu-
nity as some clans agreed to accept 
compensation money whereas others 
strongly oppose it. 
On a smaller scale, the expan-
sion of the palm-oil plantation of the 
Nabire Baru company has given rise to 
a similar dispute in Nabire where the 
Yeresiam Gua people, the traditional 
landowners, opposed the plan to build 
a palm-oil refinery on their sacred site. 
The company insisted that they had 
obtained legal documentation of the 
compensation that they paid to the 
traditional landowners. As the dispute 
remained unresolved, the tribe filed a 
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lawsuit in the Jayapura Administrative 
Court to challenge the company, but 
they lost the case in both the adminis-
trative and the appeal courts. 
The legal defeat of the Yeresiam 
Gua people is not unique. Rather, it 
exemplifies a common pattern of the 
power relations between corporations 
and indigenous Papuans in that the 
corporations act through formal pro-
cedures to secure their leases before 
they grab land from the locals through 
so-called public consultation. “It is 
called land grabbing because consul-
tation is not done in a trans parent, 
well-informed, and participative 
manner,” stated Pusaka Foundation 
Executive Director Franky Samperante 
(pers comm, March 2017). In many 
cases, landowners are invited to attend 
a consultation with a corporation to 
discuss things such as general informa-
tion about a project plan including 
benefit schemes that the locals can 
participate in. During this meeting, 
however, specific questions concern-
ing locals’ agreement or disagreement 
with the project plan are rarely heard. 
Instead, the locals are only asked to 
sign a list of attendance, which the 
corporation then uses to prove that 
it has fulfilled its legal obligation to 
hold a public consultation. Corpora-
tions often claim that such proof of 
landowner attendance at a public 
meeting signifies consent and indi-
cates that their land acquisition has 
been approved by affected community 
 leaders.
In a much larger setting, the experi-
ence of the Amungme and Kamoro 
people, who have dealt with Freeport 
McMoRan’s Grasberg Mine for the 
last fifty years, provides us with a 
similar situation. These traditional 
landowners had never been con-
sulted either by the company or the 
government prior to the beginnings 
of the Freeport operation in 1967, 
two years before Papua was officially 
incorporated into Indonesia. In 1997 
the Amungme filed two civil lawsuits 
against Freeport in the US Federal 
Court and in the state of Louisiana, 
but the suits were unsuccessful. Since 
then, Freeport Indonesia, the Indone-
sian operation of Freeport McMoRan, 
operates with huge freedom under a 
renewable “Contract of Work” with 
the Indonesian government, which 
secures the company’s work for two 
to three decades at a time (McKenna 
2016, 15, 94). At the time of this 
writing, Freeport Indonesia is in three 
legal disputes with the government of 
Indonesia regarding royalty payments, 
a share divestment obligation, and an 
obligation to build a smelter inside the 
country. The disputes remain unre-
solved, and both sides are willing to 
bring the case to international arbitra-
tion (Jensen and Asmarini 2017). 
Given these patterns of political 
repression, environmental destruc-
tion, and land grabbing in Papua, we 
should ask what roles government 
and civil society organizations play 
in responding to such challenges. 
We might still remember the role of 
Jaringan Damai Papua (jdp, Papua 
Peace Network) in addressing Papua’s 
conflicts by promoting the concept of 
“dialogue” (Tebay 2009) as a frame-
work to address these protracted 
issues in a comprehensive manner. Led 
by the Papuan Catholic Priest Neles 
Tebay and Lembaga Ilmu Pengeta-
huan Indonesia (lipi, the Indone-
sian Institute for Sciences), jdp has 
actively persuaded Indonesian national 
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authorities, particularly President Joko 
Widodo, to be willing to engage in 
political dialogue with indigenous and 
nonindigenous Papuans. 
jdp’s achievement is significant. 
First, it successfully introduced and 
clarified the term “dialogue” for state 
authorities and the Papuan public 
so that both sides have common 
understandings and expectations. jdp 
organized at least thirteen public con-
sultations in thirteen cities in Papua 
to discuss and clarify the essence of 
dialogue among the Papuans. The 
network also engages the nonindig-
enous Papuan community not only to 
disseminate similar information about 
the dialogue process but also to allow 
them to express their concerns over 
the issues (Siregar and others 2013). 
This nonindigenous community sup-
ports the Papuan call for dialogue. 
jdp also established an Indonesian 
 academics forum for Papua that 
promotes dialogue and encourages 
Indonesian policy makers to take the 
Papua issue seriously. 
Second, jdp managed to build a 
bridge between the highest level of 
Indonesian national authorities and 
Papuan civil society actors so that 
they were able to sit in the same room 
discussing various issues, including 
sensitive topics such as human rights 
violations and the political aspirations 
of Papuans. Since the jdp’s inception 
in 2009, the network has organized 
at least seven rounds of discussion 
between Papuan civil society actors 
and state actors in closed-door 
 sessions. Part of this achievement was 
the establishment of the special Unit 
for the Acceleration of Development 
in Papua and West Papua (up4b), 
which was given the mandate to accel-
erate economic development in Papua 
from 2011 to 2014. 
Despite the success of unpacking the 
heavily loaded term “dialogue,” jdp 
and lipi have not been able to con-
vince the top national policy  makers in 
Jakarta to take concrete steps toward 
dialogue with the  Papuan people. The 
state agencies dealing with politics and 
security, such as the military, police, 
and national intelligence, remain 
reluctant to go any further than talk-
ing about dialogue. They  distance 
themselves from actual dialogue 
once they  perceive any discourse that 
would encourage or lead to a politi-
cal negotiation with Papuans. As a 
result, dialogue remains confined to a 
 conceptual level and is not yet trans-
lated into policy. 
The reality is that the process of 
trust building between Jakarta and 
Papua goes very slowly (Elisabeth and 
others 2015). Adriana Elisabeth, one 
of the key proponents of the jpd-lipi 
dialogue initiative, succinctly sum-
marized this problem: “The roots 
remain the same: distrust remains 
because Indonesia was born to Papua 
with a violent face and this is not yet 
resolved” (pers comm, Oct 2015).
To respond to the ongoing vio-
lence in Papua on the one hand and 
increased international attention 
to Papua on the other, in the midst 
of 2016 the Presidential Advisory 
Council (Kantor Staf Presiden [ksp]) 
organized a consultation with civil 
society actors from Jakarta and Papua 
behind closed doors. The consulta-
tion resulted in three proposals to the 
president: appointing a special envoy 
for Papua, bringing three cases to the 
human rights court, and creating a 
new agency to coordinate the imple-
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mentation of economic development 
under the Special Autonomy Law.
Inspired by the work of Jusuf Kalla, 
who initiated the peace process of 
Aceh in 2000, the special envoy for 
Papua is meant to advise the presi-
dent in dealing with the international 
dimensions of Papua by discreetly 
engaging in dialogue with ulmwp 
leaders without making any commit-
ments. The position will also engage 
the top policy makers in Jakarta in 
order to create synergy for political 
policy toward Papua. 
The second proposal derives from 
the existing demand to bring  dossiers 
of human rights cases to the Indo-
nesian Permanent Human Rights 
Court. The proposal focuses on three 
cases—torture, rape, and extrajudi-
cial killings of civilians in Wasior (in 
2001) and Wamena (in 2003), and 
summary executions of students in 
Paniai (in 2014)—which have been 
investigated by Komnas ham but have 
not yet been heard in court (Komnas 
ham 2014; tempo.co 2016). While the 
Paniai dossier has been pending only 
for three years, the others have been 
delayed for more than a decade. Apart 
from the lack of political will on the 
part of Attorney General  Muhammad 
Prasetyo to prosecute these cases, his 
office keeps arguing that Komnas 
ham’s investigation is not adequate 
and the evidence is not complete, 
whereas Komnas ham argues to the 
contrary. As a result, the cases have 
gone nowhere.
The last proposal specifically aims 
at addressing the failure of the imple-
mentation of the Special Autonomy 
package, particularly in managing 
the Special Autonomy (otsus) Funds 
in an accountable and transparent 
manner. The lack of clear guidance 
for power sharing and account-
ability between the local and central 
governments has contributed to the 
minimal level of achievement in terms 
of Papua’s development. Unfortu-
nately, the national authorities and 
the local governments of Papua have 
different opinions. Learning from 
the  success story of Badan Reha-
bilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (Agency of 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction) 
for Aceh and Nias, the Indonesian 
National Planning Agency (Bappenas) 
prepared a draft policy to centralize 
all  authorities of otsus funds in its 
hands. If this happens, the decentral-
ized approach of otsus will be seri-
ously undermined, in the view of local 
 governments. 
As a senior staff member at the 
President’s Office explained, “When 
these proposals were presented to the 
President, he paid serious attention 
to the first proposal. He even imme-
diately asked for candidates and we 
gave them three names. But he was 
not so interested in other propos-
als” (pers comm, Sept 2016). As of 
the end of 2016, however, there had 
been no follow-up on any of the three 
 proposals.
The reluctance of Jakarta policy 
makers to address the political ques-
tion of Papua has led to a situation in 
the msg and the Pacific more broadly 
that they cannot avoid, namely, the 
international recognition of Papua. 
During the 71st Session of the United 
Nations General Assembly (unga), 
seven UN member states raised the 
issue of Papua. “Nauru started the 
intervention by highlighting the issue 
of human rights violations in Papua, 
followed by a newcomer in the dis-
political reviews • melanesia 353
course on Papua: the Marshall Islands. 
Vanuatu, Tuvalu and the Solomon 
Islands followed suit and went one 
step further by specifically highlighting 
the issue of the right to self-determina-
tion for Papuans. Tonga emphasized 
the gravity of the problem, and Palau, 
another novice, called for construc-
tive dialogue with Indonesia to solve 
the Papua issue” (Hernawan 2016). 
Unfortunately, the response from the 
Indonesian government during the 
unga session was only to reiterate 
the principles of state sovereignty and 
noninterference (Hernawan 2016). 
In other words, the Indonesian 
representative to the unga was simply 
disengaged from any discussion on 
Papua, although domestically, dif-
ferent elements of the government 
struggle with finding a solution for 
protracted problems with Papua. This 
approach reflects the government’s 
sensitivity over the Papua issue for 
international audiences, as it would 
prefer to confine the issue to domestic 
and internal spheres. 
On the domestic scene, public 
scrutiny has taken a new turn by the 
declaration of Front Rakyat Indonesia 
(fri, Indonesian People’s Front) for 
West Papua. Pulling together six Indo-
nesian people’s movements—Partai 
Pembebasan Rakyat (People’s Libera-
tion Party), Pusat Perjuangan Rakyat 
Indonesia (The Centre for Indone-
sian People’s Struggle), Pembebasan 
(Student Struggle Center for National 
Liberation), Serikat  Kebudayaan 
Masyarakat Indonesia (Society of 
Indonesian Culture), Lingkar Studi 
Sosialis (Socialist Study Group), and 
Perkumpulan Solidaritas Net (Solidar-
ity Net Association)—fri supports 
the right to self-determination for 
Papuans, according to its statement 
released on 29 November 2016 (fri 
2016). This is an entirely new develop-
ment because established human rights 
organizations in Indonesia have never 
taken such an explicit position. The 
immediate response from the Indo-
nesian authorities was predictable. 
The fri’s peaceful demonstration 
was dispersed by the police and their 
leaders were arbitrarily arrested. This 
continuing repressive treatment sug-
gests that the Indonesian authorities 
remain unable to resolve their internal 
conflicting policies for dealing with 
Papua. The discrepancy between dif-
ferent elements within the government 
only perpetuates with impunity the 
cycle of violence against indigenous 
Papuans in various forms by both 
state and non-state actors. 
budi hernawan 
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Solomon Islands
Solomon Islands is vulnerable to 
natural catastrophes like cyclones, 
tsunamis, floods, and earthquakes as 
it is in the “Pacific Ring of Fire.” For 
instance, in 1976, a huge earthquake 
displaced many people, mostly from 
South Guadalcanal, who are now 
relocated to other parts of the island. 
Likewise, Cyclone Namu in 1996 saw 
the destruction of schools and homes 
and also resulted in the relocation of 
villages, schools, and infrastructure. 
Selwyn College, a senior secondary 
school in the country, was moved from 
the east of Honiara to West Guadalca-
nal as a result of the effects of Namu. 
In recent years, the frequency of 
natural disasters occurring is particu-
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larly high (Catford 2014). The United 
Nations Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (unocha) 
summarized the impact of some of 
those disasters: “In April 2007, a 
shallow earthquake measuring 8.1 
magnitude triggered a tsunami that 
killed 52 people . . . in the Western 
and Choiseul Provinces. . . . In Febru-
ary 2013, an 8.0 magnitude earth-
quake struck off the coast of the Santa 
Cruz Islands . . . followed by a one 
metre high tsunami wave that killed 
10 people. . . . Three days of heavy 
rain from Tropical Cyclone Ita caused 
severe flooding in early April 2014. 
There were 22 confirmed deaths and 
over 50,000 people affected, mainly in 
the capital, Honiara, and other areas 
of Guadalcanal Province” (unocha 
2017). 
Such disasters are not unique to 
Solomon Islands; other neighboring 
Pacific Island communities have also 
had experiences with drastic weather, 
including pattern changes, in recent 
years. Vanuatu had to pick up the 
pieces after Tropical Cyclone Pam 
left a trail of destruction and deaths 
in 2015, and Fiji felt the full brunt of 
Tropical Cyclone Winston in 2016 
with loss of human lives and destruc-
tion of property. These countries are 
still recovering from various natural 
disasters, not to mention the hard-
ship that governments and communi-
ties face in their attempts to rebuild 
and move on. The effects of climate 
change are undeniable as occurrences 
of extreme weather events increase. 
Solomon Islands and other Pacific 
Island countries will therefore have 
to work together to influence interna-
tional decisions that address the effects 
of climate change. As former Kiribati 
President Anote Tong succinctly put 
it: “We have no choice but to engage 
even more aggressively internation-
ally because the key to our survival 
will depend on whether international 
action is taken on climate change or 
not. . . . We can and must continue to 
work diligently together to influence 
world opinion on these issues, because 
they matter to us” (2016, 24).
As in preceding years, floods, 
cyclones, landslides, and the threat of 
tsunamis continued to be the norm in 
2016 in Solomon Islands. The year 
saw continuous heavy rains and wet 
weather at different intervals that 
brought about serious floods and 
dangerous winds. In April, many com-
munities suffered damage to their food 
gardens and drinking water due to the 
effects of a tropical depression, includ-
ing continuous rainfall and flooding. 
Villager and farmer Rose Siku stated 
that “the damage to her crops would 
affect her family’s livelihood for 
several months.” She also said that 
“drinking water was contaminated, 
with most people not having access 
to tank supplies” (rnz 2016a). In 
October 2016, parts of the Solomons, 
particularly islands in Temotu Prov-
ince, close to Vanuatu, again experi-
enced heavy rains. And as 2016 was 
coming to an end, another period of 
torrential rain disrupted infrastructure 
and affected people’s livelihoods. It 
was forecast that during the 2016–17 
cyclone season (which runs from 
November to April) Solomon Islands 
could expect as many as ten tropical 
cyclones (sto 2016). 
Toward the end of 2016 and in 
early 2017, yet another  devastating 
rain with accompanying floods 
affected the country, destroying 
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bridges, roads, and food gardens. 
Flooding in Honiara resulted in no 
recorded injuries, but patients from 
the national referral hospital had to 
be relocated temporarily (Diisango 
2017). As in the aftermath of previ-
ous tropical depressions and floods, 
the government with the help of other 
agencies carried out assessments and 
provided supplies to keep people 
going until their food gardens were 
once again ready for harvesting. For 
instance, the Solomon Islands Ports 
Authority assisted the people of East 
Malaita who had been affected by the 
late 2016 rains and flooding (Saeni 
2016b). Natural disasters and suffer-
ings caused by tropical depressions 
and cyclones have become a constant 
threat and challenge to Pacific Islands 
people and governments. For Solomon 
Islands, “The average annual loss due 
to natural hazards and climate related 
events represents about 3 percent 
of the [gross domestic product] or 
approximately sbd$144 million” 
(ss 2016b). 
A particularly notable period 
involving a tropical depression and 
heavy rains occurred in April 2016 
when water from the tailings dam at 
the former Gold Ridge mine flowed 
into nearby rivers. The mine by then 
had been abandoned for about two 
years and was not operational. Two 
years earlier, arrangements had been 
made between St Barbara Limited, 
an Australian company, and a local 
company formed by landowners called 
the Gold Ridge Community Invest-
ment Limited (gcil), and the mine 
was handed over to the local company 
for a$100 (Armbruster 2016). On 
the face of it, this was a good thing, 
but critics saw the transfer as a way 
for St Barbara to neglect the liabili-
ties associated with a possible future 
environmental catastrophe. Because of 
the extremely high level of contami-
nated water in its tailings dam (abc 
News 2015), St Barbara had closed 
the mine in April 2014 during flash 
floods that killed twenty-five people 
and destroyed property along the 
Mataniko River and left 50,000 others 
homeless (abc News 2014, 2016b). 
Since taking over the mine in 
2015, gcil had tried to bring in new 
machinery to dewater (release water 
from) the tailings dam. They man-
aged to secure a dewatering machine 
in 2016, but heavy rains started again 
before they could properly install and 
activate the equipment. The rains in 
early 2016 resulted in the uncontrolled 
release of wastewater from the dam. 
That prompted communities living 
downstream to lodge complaints with 
the environment and health ministries 
(Armbruster 2016). One of the officers 
who responded to the complaints 
stated, “From our observation, the 
dewatering process appeared to be 
out of control. . . . Due to the heavy 
rain in the area over the past few days, 
water from the dam was allowed to 
flow freely through the spillway into 
the streams below” (ss 2016c). 
For the Ministry of Environment, 
Climate Change, Disaster Manage-
ment, and Meteorology (mecdm), the 
decision to dewater was likely difficult 
to make under the pressure of weather 
conditions, but there was a serious 
possibility that the walls of the tailings 
dam might otherwise be breached. 
Ultimately, Director of Environ-
ment and Conservation Division Joe 
Horokou approved the application 
by the local owners of Gold Ridge 
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to dewater, and gcil was given a 
forty-five-day license for the process. 
Dr Melchior Mataki, the environ-
ment ministry’s permanent secretary, 
stated, “The ideal situation here is for 
the discharge from the tsf [Tailing 
Storage Facility] with treatment. But 
the unfortunate thing is that if we do 
not take any measures to stop the spill 
over then we risk also the integrity of 
the full dam itself” (rnz 2016b). 
Unfortunately, there were mixed 
messages on the safety of the water 
released into the rivers from the Min-
istry of Health and Medical Services, 
the medcm, and the company owners, 
at least from the view of the public. 
On the one hand, the health minis-
try issued precautionary warnings 
at the time of dewatering, instruct-
ing downstream communities not to 
use the water for cooking, drinking, 
or bathing (rnz 2016b). But on the 
other, gcil management referred to a 
report by Simon Albert of the Uni-
versity of Queensland whose assess-
ment from the top of Metapona River 
and downstream did not mention 
anything about contamination. gcil 
company secretary Ben Afuga stated, 
“I can confirm the test results have 
shown, in fact, zero concentration of 
cyanide and very low concentration of 
arsenic and other hazardous chemi-
cals” (Fox 2016). With the upcoming 
reopening of the mine, there must be 
proper assessments of possible future 
repercussions based on previous 
 experiences.
There were also frequent earth-
quakes throughout the year, with 
a major one occurring outside of 
Makira in December 2016. Its effects 
were felt in the central and eastern 
parts of the country, with Makira-
Ulawa Province the hardest hit; the 
quake there measured at 7.9 on the 
Richter scale (Manebona 2017). The 
people of Makira, southern parts of 
Malaita, northern Guadalcanal, and 
Rennell and Bellona provinces saw 
extensive loss of property and dam-
age, especially to homes and public 
facilities. It was reported that almost 
10,000 people from those areas were 
affected by the earthquake. ReliefWeb 
reported on 14 December, “A nine-
year-old child died in Guadalcanal 
when a house collapsed. In total, 191 
houses have been destroyed and 114 
damaged. Eleven schools and a medi-
cal clinic have also been damaged by 
the quake” (ReliefWeb 2016). A newly 
built wharf in Afio, Malaita Province, 
was also damaged by the earthquake 
(Saeni 2016a).
In Kirakira town, the administra-
tive center of Makira-Ulawa Province, 
“the quake damaged a hospital, a 
church, and other buildings including 
the World Vision office” and twenty 
patients had to be evacuated from the 
hospital and taken to safer and higher 
grounds (Perry 2016). A mother 
with her one-year-old baby narrowly 
missed a brick falling from their 
house during the earthquake. She was 
quoted saying, “I felt very hopeless. I 
thought my baby and I would die. . . . I 
heard people shouting and children 
crying. Many people ran to the hills 
and we joined them” (abc News 
2016a). The head of World Vision 
in Solomon Islands, Janes Ginting, 
claimed that disaster preparedness and 
awareness put together by the govern-
ment and other actors over the years 
assisted in preventing more damage in 
this particular situation. 
A total of 10 aftershocks ranging 
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from 4.5 to 5.5 were recorded (Relief-
Web 2016). In addition to leaving 
some people homeless and destroying 
all their belongings, the earthquakes 
and tremors disrupted business and 
deterred people from going about 
their normal activities. Flights were 
canceled, and businesses and schools 
were closed. After one big earthquake 
in 2016, the residents of Gizo (who 
had experienced the effects of earth-
quakes and a tsunami that hit them in 
2007) headed for the hills for fear of a 
possible tsunami (Diisango 2017). As 
former World Vision Solomon Islands 
Director Andrew Catford stressed, 
“As the number, severity and random-
ness of disasters increases with climate 
change, it is the same group [rural 
poor] who are becoming more and 
more vulnerable” (2014, 116).
There are significant government 
and donor efforts to try and improve 
both disaster response and mitigation. 
In response to the various natural 
disasters of 2016 and the begin-
ning of 2017, the national govern-
ment through the National Disaster 
Council (ndc) and National Disaster 
Management Office (ndmo) made 
quick assessments and provided relief 
support to people. Some of the busi-
nesses and organizations that assisted 
in 2016 included Kosol Limited, 
Solomon Islands Red Cross Society, 
World Vision Solomon Islands (wvsi), 
the Australian government, and other 
donors and family members work-
ing elsewhere (sibc 2016; ss 2016a, 
2016d).
More important, given the fact 
that Solomon Islands is vulnerable 
to all sorts of natural disasters, there 
were efforts at the national level to 
set up emergency warning systems. In 
December 2016, the Lord Howe com-
munity received an early warning sys-
tem from the Secretariat of the Pacific 
Regional Environment Programme 
(sprep) through the mecdm. The 
 system is supposed to allow people 
ample time to seek shelter before a 
tsunami strikes (ss 2016b; Filia 2016). 
Since it is a new initiative, it will take 
time before we know the warning 
system’s level of usefulness. 
People in Solomon Islands are 
also facing effects of climate change 
in terms of sea-level rise. These 
threats are real and present, and 
for some  Solomon Islanders living 
on artificial and low-lying islands, 
day-to-day experiences have been a 
struggle. Prime Minister Manasseh 
Sogavare visited Sulufou, one of the 
small islands in Malaita that is vis-
ibly suffering from sea-level rise. He 
was there to officially open a water 
supply and sanitation system for the 
Islanders. Fanalei Island was also 
reported as being seriously affected 
by sea-level rise and the likelihood of 
Fanalei becoming uninhabitable in the 
near future is high (Sanga 2017). As 
Rebecca Monson and her coauthors 
wrote, “In some places, this [sea-level 
rise] has resulted in the relocation 
of entire communities from small 
islands and atolls to larger islands. 
Other communities are currently 
discussing the prospect of relocating 
to higher ground” (2012, 103). The 
Conversation reported, “Recently five 
reef islands in the remote Solomon 
Islands have been lost completely to 
sea-level rise and coastal erosion, and 
a further six have been badly eroded. 
These islands . . . range from one to 
five hectares.” The report also stated 
that Nuatambu Island, which hosted 
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twenty-five families, saw firsthand the 
inundation of seawater and the wash-
ing away of eleven houses since 2011 
(The Conversation 2016). This issue 
is not going to go away; Solomon 
Islands, like other Pacific Islands, will 
have to make some hard decisions in 
the future with regard to the reloca-
tion of many of its people.
It is therefore important that the 
current momentum on climate-change 
negotiations at international forums 
be maintained and passionately sup-
ported. Pacific Islands leadership and 
influence in the decisions that led to 
the signing of the Paris Agreement 
has been crucial. As sprep confirmed, 
“The Pacific islands have helped make 
world history as the Paris Agreement 
comes into force, with all 14 Pacific 
island parties to the United Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change 
having ratified the Paris Agreement. 
Playing a pivotal role with the Alliance 
of Small Islands States (aosis) at the 
Climate Conference in December last 
year [2015] which brought about the 
Paris Agreement, the Pacific islands 
have shown solidarity yet again in 
ratifying the Agreement which starts 
from the year 2020” (sprep 2016). 
And as Tuvalu Prime Minister Enele 
Sopoaga rightly stated, “I think it is 
timely given the full force of the Paris 
Agreement, that we ourselves clarify 
and understand those issues so we 
can address the provisions of loss and 
damage in the Paris Agreement with 
clarity” (Lanyon 2016). 
Now that the president of the 
United Nations General Assembly 
(Peter Thomson from Fiji) and the 
cochairs of the Pacific Ocean Sum-
mit (Hawai‘i Governor David Ige 
and  Federated States of Micronesia 
President Peter Christian) are all 
from the Pacific region, it is impor-
tant that Pacific Islanders strategize 
more and work harder to influence 
the outcomes of global decisions that 
address climate change and sea-level 
rise. Climate change and its effects will 
continue to haunt Solomon Islands 
because of sea-level rise, changes to 
weather patterns, and the increased 
frequency of tropical cyclones, earth-
quakes, and other extreme natural 
events. As a member of the global 
community, Solomon Islands is 
 hopeful that the agreements reached 
in 2017 will complement and add to 
the global commitments made earlier 
to mitigate and address some of the 
challenges that come with natural 
disasters.
gordon leua nanau
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Vanuatu
Following one of the most tumultuous 
years in Vanuatu’s history with the 
trial, conviction, and imprisonment of 
fourteen members of Parliament (mps) 
on charges of bribery and corruption, 
there was some hope at the beginning 
of 2016 that things could only get 
better, though remnants of past events 
still remained to be dealt with. Unfor-
tunately, the country faced serious 
economic problems stemming from 
the destruction brought in March 
2015 by Cyclone Pam—a category five 
storm that ravaged the archipelago’s 
eastern and southern islands as well 
as the nation’s capital of Port Vila. 
The surprise dissolution of Parliament 
in November 2015, which triggered 
a snap election, was not welcomed 
initially but did have the effect of 
finally removing the discredited care-
taker government of Sato Kilman and 
allowing for a fresh start with a host 
of new politicians (Van Trease 2016, 
484–487). 
Despite the short time between 
when the election was announced 
(21 November 2015) and the actual 
voting day (22 January 2016), the 
electoral process itself proceeded in 
the normal way with few problems, 
though the voter turnout was low—a 
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mere 57 percent of registered voters 
compared to 70.4 percent in 2008 
and 63.2 percent in 2012. Likewise, 
several  political parties faced difficul-
ties in organizing their campaigns, due 
in part to the fact that their leaders 
had been imprisoned. Indeed, fifteen 
members of the last Parliament were 
banned from contesting the election—
the fourteen who had been convicted 
plus Willy Jimmy, who pleaded guilty 
and received a suspended sentence. 
Under section 42 of Vanuatu’s Lead-
ership Code, when a leader is con-
victed of a breach of the code and is 
dismissed from office, “the leader is 
disqualified from standing for election 
as, or being appointed as, a leader of 
any kind for a period of 10 years from 
the date of the conviction” (Leader-
ship Code Act 2006). The selection of 
candidates was made more difficult 
in some cases when it was rumored 
that several imprisoned individuals 
attempted to influence decisions from 
their cells. 
As a result of the confusion, 
fewer candidates contested the elec-
tion—270, representing a total of 
thirty-seven parties plus sixty-two 
independents—compared to 349 
candidates in 2008 and 345 in 2012. 
Nevertheless, the number was still 
large enough to have an impact and to 
split the vote, as has been the pattern 
since the 1990s, to the extent that no 
single party was able to gain a major-
ity in the fifty-two-seat Parliament. 
The result, once again, was the need 
to form a coalition government. It 
should be noted that the majority of 
the parties were newly created (ie, 
they did not contest earlier elections), 
fielded very few candidates, and only 
received a small percentage of the total 
votes cast. The results were divided as 
follows: 58.7 percent for the top ten 
parties, 22.8 percent for the remaining 
twenty-seven smaller parties, and 18.5 
percent for the sixty-two independents 
(Republic of Vanuatu 2016; Early 
2016). 
The root of the problem lies in the 
fact that Vanuatu’s political culture 
has undergone a significant change 
since the early days of independence, 
when politics was dominated by only 
two main parties—the Vanua‘aku 
Pati (vp) and the Union of Moderate 
Parties (ump)—with the vp wining 
a majority of the seats in 1979 (the 
election just before independence) 
and again in 1983 and 1987. Vanuatu 
uses the Single Non-Transferable Vote 
(sntv) system for its nine multi-seat 
constituencies and First Past the 
Post (fptp) for the remaining eight 
single-seat constituencies. The sntv 
was adopted to provide a degree of 
proportionality, as required under the 
constitution, and worked well dur-
ing the 1980s. In 1991, however, the 
vp split, with the result that no single 
party obtained a majority, therefore 
requiring the formation of a coalition 
government—the pattern that has 
existed since that time (Van Trease 
2005). 
The bribery case and imprison-
ment of elected mps was obviously a 
prominent issue during the campaign, 
but it is clear that it did not have an 
overwhelming impact on the results. 
There was not a major swing against 
the  parties that constituted the Kilman 
government as might have been 
expected, given the number of mem-
bers who had been found guilty and 
imprisoned. The fact was, however, 
that all the former Kilman government 
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parties were represented in the elec-
tion and with few exceptions suc-
ceeded in getting members elected—in 
most cases achieving a level of success 
similar to what they had enjoyed in 
the 2012 election or slightly better. 
 Compared to 2012, the results were 
as follows: the Green Coalition (gc) 
down from 3 to 2, the Iauko Group 
up from 3 to 4, the ump up from 5 to 
6, the People’s Progressive Party (ppp) 
down from 6 to 1, and the Vanuatu 
Republican Party and the Natatok 
Indigenous People’s Democratic 
Party both losing their single seats in 
2016. The poor showing of ppp, the 
party of Prime Minister Sato Kilman, 
reflects his weak performance during 
the crisis in the last months of 2015, 
which probably undermined the party 
nationally, though he received the 
highest total vote among the seven 
candidates on his home island of 
Malakula. 
However, the parties that had 
 constituted the Opposition under 
former Prime Minister Joe Natuman 
prior to the January 2016 election—
the vp, National United Party (nup), 
Graon mo Jastis Pati (gjp), Ras-
semblement Des Mouvements Pour Le 
Changement (rmc), and Melanesian 
Progressive Party (mpp)—were quick 
to point out that their accusations 
of corruption and moves against 
members of the Kilman government 
had been vindicated and they would 
have used this fact to promote them-
selves.  Nevertheless, the results do not 
indicate that this argument had much 
effect on voter opinion. Compared to 
the 2012 election, the results in 2016 
for the major parties that made up the 
Opposition were mixed: the vp down 
from 8 to 6, gjp up from 4 to 6, nup 
remaining at 4, rmc remaining at 3, 
and mpp down from 2 to 1.
A better description of the elec-
tion results was that, as usual, they 
reflected “localised and clientelistic 
policy platforms, widespread patron-
age, political fragmentation, and a 
proliferation of small parties” (Naupa 
2016). Moreover, they indicate that 
the old Anglophone/Francophone 
divide still played a part in the elec-
tion. Indeed, it was not uncommon 
to hear former Kilman government 
candidates claim that the conviction 
of the former government mps was 
politically motivated, pointing to the 
fact that corruption was not new to 
Vanuatu politics, but that few  corrupt 
politicians had been indicted in the 
past. The fact that the majority of 
the convicted members were them-
selves Francophones and members of 
traditionally Francophone parties (eg, 
the ump, the gc, the Vanuatu Repub-
lican Party, and several from the rmc, 
which had split) fed the perception of 
some that the old Anglophone/Fran-
cophone rivalry was still a divisive 
factor in Vanuatu politics. This is not 
to say that Francophones are more 
prone to corruption than Anglophones 
but rather that the former Opposi-
tion pressed their case against those 
mps suspected of bribery, and their 
common party affiliations led to this 
perception.
In early January, as the campaign 
got underway, party leaders who had 
worked together in the Opposition 
met on Pele Island to negotiate an 
agreement to form the next govern-
ment. They established what they 
called the Unity Front for Change 
(ufc), which included the vp, nup, 
gjp, mpp, and Hope Party (vdp, 5 Jan 
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2017). By February, following publica-
tion of the election results, the number 
had grown to eleven political groups, 
with a total of thirty-six newly elected 
mps, who signed a memorandum 
of understanding to work together 
toward the formation of a new coali-
tion government. In addition to the 
original five parties, the new group-
ing also included the rmc, gc, ump, 
Vanuatu National Development Party, 
Nagriamel Movement, and Leaders 
Group (vdp, 4 Feb 2016). 
As is usual in Vanuatu during 
the period of coalition formation, 
the opposing camp, which included 
members of the Kilman-led caretaker 
government, disavowed the claims of 
the ufc, announcing to the Vanuatu 
Daily Post that they themselves would 
be forming the new government when 
Parliament met for the first time on 12 
February. However, with word spread-
ing that the ufc group was discussing 
a joint policy platform for the first 
one hundred days and negotiating the 
difficult task of sharing ministerial 
portfolios, the expectation was strong 
that the old, criminally tainted govern-
ment of Sato Kilman had been swept 
away (vdp, 9 Feb, 10 Feb 2016). 
At the Pele meeting, reelected gjp 
leader Ralph Regenvanu was a prime 
mover in the negotiations on govern-
ment formation, and the results reflect 
well his desire to see a new beginning 
in Vanuatu politics. He is committed 
to the idea of promoting new politi-
cal alliances—balancing both Anglo-
phones and Francophones—to replace 
the old divisions that since the 1990s 
had only led to political instability 
and chaos. Not surprising, there-
fore, the newly elected mps quickly 
coalesced around the candidacy of 
Charlot Salwai—a Francophone who 
had split from the ump the previous 
year, founded his own rmc party, 
and worked with the Natuman-led 
Opposition during the period of the 
bribery scandal. Clearly, Regenvanu 
and Natuman were prepared to forgo 
pressing their own claims for the 
prime ministership for what they saw 
as a positive move toward creating 
political stability into the future. Both 
the gjp and vp had won six seats each 
compared to only three for the rmc. 
The new government cabinet, which 
was confirmed when Parliament sat 
for the first time on 12 February 2016, 
consisted of eight parties and two 
independents—seven Anglophones 
and six Francophones. 
Despite a few shifts in party loy-
alty, the new coalition government 
remained fairly stable during the first 
half of the year. The only significant 
changes occurred in April, when 
recount of votes for the Efate rural 
constituency led to the runner-up in 
the four-seat constituency, gjp can-
didate Gillion William, replacing the 
mpp candidate Nato Taiwia, who had 
served briefly as minister of youth and 
sport (vdp, 13 April, 25 April 2016). 
In addition, a gjp candidate, Uri 
Warawara, won in a by-election for 
the Malo/Aore constituency following 
the death of the successful Nagriamel 
candidate in January (vdp, 18 June, 
30 June 2016). The effect of these two 
events was to increase the total num-
ber of gjp mps from 6 to 8, making it 
the largest party in Parliament.
The party that seemed to have 
 difficulty getting organized after the 
election was the ump, which initially 
committed itself to join in forming 
the new government in February. 
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However, the party executive was in 
conflict due to the fact that the party 
leader, Serge Vohor, was in jail and 
continued to try to exert his influence 
(Vanuatu Daily Digest, 5 Feb 2016). 
By April, the party was split, with half 
continuing to endorse Vohor as presi-
dent and the other half refusing to give 
support (vdp, 22 April 2016). By May, 
the split deepened with Vohor opening 
the ump congress via telephone from 
the Low Risk Correctional Services 
facility where he was imprisoned and 
being elected the party’s president with 
Ishmael Kalsakau as deputy. Within 
forty-eight hours, a second president, 
Jacques Mariango, was elected by the 
opposing faction, based on Efate (vdp, 
21 May 2016). By late June, the split 
had reached the point that one of the 
ump Efate mps, Norris Jack Kalmet, 
had joined the government as the new 
minister for youth and sport (vdp, 29 
June 2016). The Vohor faction with 
Ishmael Kalsakau as deputy remained 
in Opposition. 
Yet another shift in party loyalty 
related to the ump occurred in April, 
when three Iauko Group mps decided 
to join the Efate faction in support of 
the Salwai government (vdp, 23 April 
2016). In late May, two other Iauko 
Group members defected and joined 
the ppp—the result being that for the 
moment the Iauko Group disappeared 
as an independent political party in 
Parliament (vdp, 30 May 2016). By 
mid-September, the Iauko Group had 
reconstituted itself and agreed to work 
together with the vp—from which it 
had split several years earlier—and the 
five mps confirmed their willingness to 
cooperate in a custom reconciliation 
ceremony involving the killing of a pig 
and the exchanging of mats and other 
items (vdp, 15 Sept 2016). Luckily for 
the government, it had a solid base of 
member support, which meant it could 
survive such party instability. 
The 100 Days Plan, which Prime 
Minister Salwai launched on 26 
February, focused on development 
priorities. First mentioned was the 
examination of the country’s financial 
situation—to put in place cost-cutting 
measures and explore possible new 
sources of revenue, including a review 
of the tax base. Related to this, the 
new government expressed the desire 
to see an increase in the participation 
of Ni-Vanuatu in the economic sector, 
including trade and tourism, and saw 
the strengthening of the coopera-
tive movement as vital to achieving 
this objective. The plan specifically 
mentioned the implementation of 
the Land Law Reform, which had 
begun with the passage in 2015 of the 
Custom Land Management Act and 
focused on strengthening procedures 
related to land leasing to better protect 
the rights of custom owners. With 
regard to internal affairs, the govern-
ment highlighted its aim to review the 
decentralization policy and to work 
toward strengthening the Vanuatu 
Police Force, which still suffers from 
weaknesses in leadership. The plan 
pointed to the need to review Vanu-
atu’s various international agreements 
and relationships and, as would be 
expected, there was a focus on the 
various social sectors, including the 
judiciary, health, and education (vdp, 
27 Feb 2016). 
The Opposition bloc was quick to 
comment on the policies announced 
by the new government, claiming 
strangely that pardoning of the four-
teen imprisoned politicians was one 
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of the features of the 100 Days Plan. 
The Prime Minister’s Office responded 
that the issue of pardon was “not 
 development” and therefore not a 
“prioritized target” of the govern-
ment. With some of their own party 
leaders imprisoned, Opposition mem-
bers were determined to find a way to 
achieve their release or at least reduce 
their sentences. The fate of the impris-
oned  politicians,  convicted of bribery 
charges in  October 2015, continued 
to be a focus of attention throughout 
most of 2016.
Indeed, one day before the new 
government was sworn in—when 
the government was still in care-
taker mode under Sato Kilman—the 
imprisoned politicians applied to the 
Parole Board to be considered for 
early release. All the applications 
requested consideration on compas-
sionate grounds—several citing health 
reasons. Likewise, the day before the 
release of the 100 Days Plan, Leader 
of the Opposition Ishmael Kalkasau 
(ump) called on the head of state, 
President Baldwin Lonsdale, and 
raised the possibility of pardoning the 
imprisoned politicians (vdp, 29 Feb 
2016). A further request for parole 
consideration was rejected at a meet-
ing of the Parole Board in early March 
(vdp, 4 March 2016). 
These efforts were unsuccessful 
because of the simple fact that, under 
section 51(1) of the Correctional 
Services Act [Eligibility for Parole], the 
prisoners were not eligible. The act 
stipulates that “a detainee is eligible 
for consideration by a community 
parole board for release on parole 
upon the expiry of a half of his or her 
sentence” (Correctional Services Act 
2006). At this point, the fourteen had 
served just three months of their three- 
and four-year jail terms. 
It should be noted that while a 
Community Parole Board considers 
a parole application, under chap-
ter 6, article 38 of the constitution, 
“The President of the Republic may 
 pardon, commute or reduce a sentence 
imposed on a person convicted of an 
offence. Parliament may provide for 
a committee to advise the President in 
the exercise of this function” (Con-
stitution of the Republic of Vanuatu 
2006). With the events of Octo-
ber 2015 in mind (when the acting 
president, Marcellino Pipite, pardoned 
himself and some of the other politi-
cians who had been convicted on 
bribery charges before they could be 
sentenced), Parliament decided to take 
up the option provided in article 38 
and tabled a motion to set up such 
a committee to advise the president. 
Over objections from the Opposition 
that the mechanisms pertaining to the 
functioning of the committee were not 
specified, the motion passed with 33 
votes in favor to 9 against (vdp, 26 
March 2016).
The next chapter in the saga of 
the convicted politicians began in 
April, when two of the fifteen mps 
convicted of bribery the previous 
year—Willy Jimmy, who was serv-
ing a suspended sentence, and Silas 
Yatan, who was still in jail—appeared 
before the Appeal Court to challenge 
their dismissal as leaders (vdp, 9 April 
2016). In the 2015 bribery trial, Judge 
Mary Sey had charged the accused 
mps under the Penal Code, leaving the 
issue of breaches under the Leader-
ship Code to be dealt with later. Judge 
Sey had made this decision due to an 
earlier ruling that an irregularity had 
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occurred with regard to the alleged 
breaches of the Leadership Code. 
Following an appeal to the Supreme 
Court by the public prosecutor for 
clarification in view of the convic-
tions handed down under the Penal 
Code, Judge David Chetwynd con-
firmed orders, as stipulated under the 
Leadership Code, “dismissing all the 
Defendants from office and disqualify-
ing them from standing for election 
or being appointed as a leader of any 
kind for a period of 10 years” (vusc 
2015).
The appeal was based on the argu-
ment that the two former mps “were 
no longer leaders when the ban was 
made December last year [2015] after 
the Leadership Code charges were 
invoked by the Public Prosecutor. . . .
Willy Jimmy and Silas Yatan claimed 
the December decision should have 
happened earlier in October when 
they were initially convicted for brib-
ery and corruption.” The view of the 
Appeal Court was, however, that the 
argument was “misconceived” and 
that the Supreme Court’s decision to 
ban the fourteen convicted politicians 
from holding office for ten years was 
correct (vdp, 15 April, 16 April 2016).
The next major chapter in the 
bribery and corruption saga was the 
case against eleven of the jailed politi-
cians and one of their assisting lawyers 
on charges of conspiracy to defeat 
the course of justice, related to the 
decision by the acting president at the 
time, Marcellino Pipite—the  president 
was overseas—to pardon himself 
and ten other convicted, but not yet 
charged, mps. In addition to Pipite, the 
group included Paul Telukluk, Silas 
Yatan, Tony Nari, John Amos, Arnold 
Prasad, Tony Wright, Sebastien Harry, 
Thomas Laken, Jean-Yves Chabot, 
Jonas James, and lawyer Wilson 
Iauma (vdp, 11 May 2016). It should 
be noted that Moana Carcasses  Kalosil 
attended the meeting at  Mangoes 
 Restaurant (in Port Vila) where an 
agreement was made to attempt a 
pardon, but he chose not to become 
involved. Likewise, Serge Vohor, John 
Amos, and Stephen Kalsakau, appar-
ently, did not get involved. The case 
involved several months of prepara-
tion, with the recruitment by the 
defendants of foreign lawyers and a 
pretrial hearing (vdp, 10 June 2016).
The charges involved the activi-
ties of the defendants over three days, 
9–11 October 2015, which took 
place at Mangoes Restaurant and the 
Ministry of Infrastructure and Public 
Utilities, and concerned the plotting 
and execution of a plan—includ-
ing the formulation and printing of 
documents—to use the absence of the 
president from Vanuatu to affect their 
pardon in the bribery and corruption 
case. The case lasted for two weeks in 
August (vdp, 3 Aug, 4 Aug, 9–12 Aug, 
16 Aug, 17 Aug 2016). The onus to 
prove guilt lay with the prosecution, 
and it was the conclusion of presid-
ing Supreme Court Justice David 
Chetwynd that all the defendants 
were “guilty of conspiracy to defeat, 
obstruct or prevent the course of jus-
tice in that they all, between the time 
of conviction on 9th October 2015 
and 11th October 2015, asked for or 
arranged pardons to be granted with 
the intention that they escaped any 
sanction of the Court” (vusc 2016a). 
Sentencing took place at the end 
of September (vdp, 30 Sept 2016). 
Judge Chetwynd based his decisions 
on the degree to which he felt each 
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of the individuals had been involved 
in promoting the illegal pardon. He 
viewed Marcellino Pipite as  having 
been the “lynch pin in this conspir-
acy . . . [and] the most culpable of all 
the defendants” and gave him four 
years. Toni Nari was also seen as “one 
of the prime movers . . . His enthu-
siasm and his eagerness at the very 
early stages of the conspiracy drove 
the others on” and he was sentenced 
to three years and six months. The 
remaining mps—with the excep-
tion of Jonas James, who received a 
sentence of two years—were all given 
sentences of between two years and 
three months and three years and 
six months in addition to time given 
for the bribery offense. Comment-
ing that he recognized that Wilson 
Iauma, the only lawyer charged in the 
conspiracy, had faced heavy pressure 
from his employer, the judge felt that 
“as a  lawyer and officer of the court 
he should, quite frankly, have known 
better. . . . [and that] all the lawyers 
involved should face some sanction.” 
Iauma was sentenced to two years and 
nine months in addition to the time 
given for the bribery offense (vusc 
2016b). 
In mid-October the seven jailed 
former mps made a last attempt to 
find a way to freedom. On 13 Octo-
ber 2016, they testified in the Appeal 
Court in a case lodged by Moana 
Carcasses  Kalosil in July 2016 on 
behalf of all fourteen imprisoned 
former mps, claiming that “they were 
protected by parliamentary immunity 
when prosecuted for bribery last year 
[2015]” (vdp, 15 Oct 2016). The crux 
of their argument was that during 
the period between 8 and 16 June in 
2015—during which time (on 12 June) 
they were asked by their lawyers to 
appear in the Magistrate Court with 
regard to the bribery charges—Parlia-
ment was in session. As a result, they 
claimed that their appearance involved 
a prosecution of the applicants in 
breach of article 27 (2) of the constitu-
tion, which states that no member of 
Parliament “may, during a session of 
Parliament or of one of its commit-
tees, be arrested or prosecuted for any 
offence, except with the authorization 
of Parliament in exceptional circum-
stances.” As a result, the application 
called for the decision of the 2015 
bribery case and its subsequent cases 
to be quashed. The chief justice ruled 
when hearing the case that it should 
be dealt with by the Supreme Court 
(vuca 2016). 
When the case was heard in 
November 2016, Supreme Court 
Judge J P Geoghegan dismissed the 
claim that the constitutional rights of 
the former mps had been breached. 
He based his decision on the fact that 
the 12 June 2015 hearing “was not 
a hearing which the applicants were 
required to attend or which they 
were compelled in any way to attend. 
They were not subject to bail condi-
tions at that time and had not been 
served with summonses to attend 
Court. In the circumstances they were 
completely within their rights not 
to attend Court and the advice that 
they received from their lawyers was 
wrong” (vusc 2016c). This did not 
end the discussion of the imprisoned 
mps, but it ceased at least for the rest 
of the year.
In June, a topic that had been under 
discussion by a special committee for 
months—the Taskforce for Politi-
cal Reform led by Minister of Lands 
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Ralph Regenvanu—seemed at last to 
have reached the point where serious 
public consideration and government 
action might be possible and it was 
announced that a special sitting of 
Parliament would be arranged to table 
and debate proposed changes to the 
constitution. There had been attempts 
in the past—in 1994 and 2004—to 
address this issue in response to the 
increasing political instability related 
to the continual need to create coali-
tions of parties in order to govern, 
but they failed to gain the necessary 
parliamentary support to proceed. 
The fact that the government, with 
thirty-nine mps, held an overwhelming 
majority and, in effect, the two-thirds 
of Vanuatu’s fifty-two-seat Parliament 
to amend the constitution,  motivated 
the new government to move ahead. 
A bill was prepared incorporat-
ing twenty-five amendments, the 
7th  Constitutional Amendment to 
 Vanuatu’s Supreme Law, which the 
government planned to debate in a 
special sitting of Parliament scheduled 
to take place on 9 June 2016. 
Broadly, the amendments were 
designed to enable the regulation of 
political parties; safeguard political 
stability by imposing certain restric-
tions on elected candidates and 
 parties; regulate the involvement of 
naturalized citizens in Vanuatu poli-
tics; enable the regulation of reserved 
seats for women; regulate cost-
effective election procedures; change 
the procedure for the appointment of 
the Speaker of Parliament; provide 
for the independence of the auditor 
general; extend the life of Parliament 
from the current four to five years; 
regulate the powers of Parliament to 
dissolve Parliament; regulate the pow-
ers of the prime minister and other 
ministers following the dissolution 
of Parliament and before an election; 
regulate the occurrence of votes of no 
confidence against the prime minister; 
and expand the definition of a leader 
to include individuals in the private 
sector working with the government 
(vdp, 4 June 2016). 
Within a few days, the Opposition 
let it be known that they were not in 
support of the constitutional changes, 
that is, that they did not support the 
government’s strategy. The leader 
of the Opposition, seasoned lawyer 
Ishmael Kalsakau, was very clear 
when he announced that “the Gov-
ernment needs to consult the people 
before bringing any amendments 
to the Constitution to Parliament” 
(vdp, 8 June 2016). He reminded the 
government that while the constitution 
permits amendments to be passed by 
Parliament with a two-thirds majority 
of mps present (article 85), it stipulates 
under article 86 that any amendment 
bill “regarding the status of Bislama, 
English and French, the electoral 
system, or the parliamentary system, 
passed by Parliament under Article 85, 
shall not come into effect unless it has 
been supported in a national referen-
dum.” Clearly, most of the proposed 
changes related to the electoral system 
and parliamentary system and would 
require a referendum to enable their 
adoption into the constitution. 
It was not surprising, therefore, 
when the Opposition boycotted the 
first session of the special sitting, 
preventing Parliament from proceed-
ing. The number of mps present was 
35, that is, 4 short of the 39 (75%) 
required for a quorum. The Speaker 
advised that the next sitting would be 
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delayed for a week to 16 June, when 
only a two-thirds majority of mps 
would be required for the sitting to 
go ahead. At the same time, in obvi-
ous response to the objections raised 
by the Opposition, the prime minister 
announced that the government had 
decided to table a motion to establish 
a Constitutional Reform Committee, 
which would initiate public discussion 
before proceeding to a referendum 
(vdp, 10 June 2016).
In the meantime, preparation was 
underway for the first ordinary session 
of Parliament to meet on 13 June to 
debate twelve other bills (vdp, 11 June 
2016). However, before Parliament 
could sit, following an urgent consti-
tutional petition filed by the leader of 
the Opposition, Supreme Court Judge 
Oliver Saksak restrained the Speaker 
from convening and opening the first 
ordinary session. The argument from 
Ishmael Kalsakau was that there had 
been an infringement of the consti-
tution “because the Speaker has no 
power to call to order another session 
while a Special Sitting is in motion” 
(vdp, 14 June 2016). The next day, the 
Supreme Court refused a stay order 
application from the Speaker and, at 
the same time, the leader of the Oppo-
sition defended his action—not as 
“political point scoring” but merely as 
a “constitutional issue affecting rights 
[that] should not be dramatized into a 
political issue” (vdp, 16 June 2016). 
The special parliamentary sitting 
took place with fifty mps present, 
 during which it was agreed to estab-
lish a Parliamentary Ad Hoc Commit-
tee to consult with the people over the 
proposed 7th Constitutional Amend-
ment to Vanuatu’s Supreme Law. It 
was planned that the prime minister 
would appoint a twenty-seven-mem-
ber Bipartisan Constitutional Review 
Committee to debate how to reduce 
Vanuatu’s endemic political instabil-
ity. Members would include the leader 
of the Opposition, representatives of 
each of the political parties in Parlia-
ment, two independent mps chosen 
by the Speaker, and representatives 
from the Vanuatu Christian Coun-
cil, Malvatumauri National Council 
of Chiefs, Department of Women’s 
Affairs, National Youth Council, 
Chamber of Commerce, Council of 
Trade Unions, Vanuatu Association 
of Non-Governmental Organisations 
(vango), and Disabled Society. It was 
reported that the mps agreed unani-
mously to take all issues requiring a 
referendum to the committee. Minister 
Regenvanu informed the press that 
a massive awareness campaign was 
planned to be presented around the 
country in August (Vanuatu Daily 
Digest, 17 June, 21 June 2016). 
Another major issue that aroused 
significant debate—increasing as the 
year progressed—was an announce-
ment following from the 100 Days 
Plan to instigate a “national revenue 
review reform” with “the possibil-
ity of introducing new forms of taxes 
such as the personal income and 
corporate tax to help bring the desired 
revenue level needed” (vdp, 15 June 
2016). A month later, the first serious 
opposition emerged with the Chamber 
of Commerce voicing its concern that 
“imposing an income tax will drive 
away foreign investment” and that 
the Value Added Tax (vat) should be 
raised instead and efforts to improve 
compliance instigated (vdp, 21 July 
2016). Government planning, how-
ever, continued with the announce-
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ment in August that the Cabinet of 
Ministers had approved a new tax 
plan, expressing the argument that “as 
the demand for services continues to 
grow, the Government is finding it dif-
ficult to finance these demands” (vdp, 
18 Aug 2016). The plan would require 
anyone to pay income tax who earned 
more than 500,000 vatu per year, an 
amount that was eventually increased 
to 750,000 vatu [100 vatu = us$.90] 
(vdp, 25 Aug 2016). To lead public 
discussion, the government established 
a Revenue Review Team, which held 
a number of meetings in an attempt 
to gather public reaction and expand 
public support. 
Opposition to the new tax propos-
als began to mount in September with 
comments appearing in the Daily Post 
and on talk radio from representa-
tives of the business community, who 
took the position that the income 
threshold was too low (vdp, 1 Sept 
2016). The Opposition also voiced 
its disapproval of the tax proposals 
and urged the government to “con-
sider other  revenue raising measures 
before considering introducing income 
and corporate taxes in Vanuatu”; the 
government responded that it would 
embark on a nationwide consultation 
regarding the income tax plan (vdp, 
12 Sept, 13 Sept 2016). There were 
mixed reactions to the plan, with the 
leader of the Opposition speaking 
out most strongly against it (vdp, 21 
Sept, 22 Sept 2016). The government 
responded by accusing him of “speak-
ing for the interests of a small group 
of businessmen who are his friends” 
and criticized him for trying to force 
the Speaker to convene the 2nd Ordi-
nary Session of Parliament, creating 
confusion among the public (vdp, 3 
Oct 2016). By the end of October, the 
Tourism Owners Association spoke 
out strongly against the introduction 
of income and corporate taxes, argu-
ing that their investments would be 
significantly harmed. 
By this point, the government 
seemed to back off on the issue—
responding, perhaps, to the fact 
that tourism, recognized as the most 
important source of revenue for the 
government, was increasing. Indeed, 
there had been significant criticism of 
the government regarding the slow 
pace of repairing the main airport 
runway at Bauerfield in Port Vila. 
The problem had existed for several 
years and had worsened since 2015, 
due most likely to damage caused by 
the heavy military cargo planes that 
had been used to ferry relief supplies 
to Vanuatu in the wake of Cyclone 
Pam. In January, Air New Zealand 
 suspended service to Port Vila due 
to the damaged airstrip and Virgin 
Airlines followed suit a few days 
later (vdp, 23 Jan, 29 Jan 2016). 
Qantas also stopped its codeshare 
 arrangements with Air Vanuatu, 
leaving only the national airline, Fiji 
Airlines, and Solomon Airlines to 
service Vanuatu (vdp, 25 April 2016). 
Virgin resumed flying in May, but 
the other two major overseas carriers 
remained absent from Vanuatu skies 
for the remainder of the year (vdp, 
24 May 2016). The impact on the 
tourist industry was significant and 
remained a major issue for the govern-
ment for the rest of the year, adding 
to  economic concerns and increasing 
pressure. Sorting this out has revealed 
the negative impacts of political inter-
ference in bodies like Airports Vanu-
atu. Air Vanuatu ultimately needed a 
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us$4 million government bailout to 
keep operating.
By November, a combination of 
events began to create a sense that 
the government might be under 
threat. Opposition groups had expe-
rienced consecutive defeats related 
to the fate of their imprisoned com-
rades. In August, those involved 
with  Marcellino Pipite in attempting 
to “defeat, obstruct or prevent the 
course of justice” (vusc 2016a) had 
been convicted and sentenced, and 
in November the appeal by Moana 
Carcasses Kalosil to have all charges 
dismissed—arguing that their right 
to immunity had been violated—was 
rejected (vusc 2016c). Likewise, the 
government was finding it difficult to 
make progress with either its pro-
posed constitutional changes or tax 
reform. The inclination of some mps 
to switch party allegiance may have 
led the Opposition to think that they 
had a chance to topple the government 
and, therefore, they made plans to act 
during the forthcoming 2nd Ordinary 
Session of Parliament. 
On Wednesday, 24 November, 
the Speaker announced that he had 
received a motion of no confidence 
signed by thirty-one mps, though six 
of the signatures had since been with-
drawn, and that it was in order and 
would be dealt with on 30 November. 
Reasons given for the motion included 
objections to the amendments to the 
constitution, opposition to the pro-
posed tax reforms, and criticism of the 
prime minister’s recent trip to China. 
The prime minister made several 
changes to his ministerial portfolios in 
an attempt to strengthen the govern-
ment’s position (vdp, 24 Nov 2016). 
The 2nd Ordinary Session of 
Parliament was scheduled to open 
on 8 December, but the Opposition 
mps boycotted the session, though 
thirty-three mps on the government 
side were present. Since a two-thirds 
majority is required for the first 
 sitting, the Speaker ruled that the 
opening would be delayed until the 
following week—Monday, 12 Decem-
ber. As a result of the situation, Parlia-
ment was not scheduled to meet for 
certain in the next week for its Special 
Sitting to debate the Report of the 
Ad-Hoc Committee on Constitutional 
Review (vdp, 9 Dec 2016). However, 
under the circumstances, the prime 
minister requested that the Special 
Sitting be canceled. By the following 
week, when Parliament met for its 
Ordinary Session, it was clear that the 
Opposition did not have the number 
of votes to prevail, with thirty-three 
mps sitting on the government side; 
the deputy leader, therefore, withdrew 
the motion. The Salwai government 
thus remained in power as the year 
came to an end. 
howard van trease
References
Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu. 
2006. Available from Pacific Islands 
Legal Information Institute:  
http://www.paclii.org
Correctional Services Act. 2006. Vanuatu 
Consolidated Legislation. Available from 
Pacific Island Legal Information Institute:  
http://www.paclii.org
Early, Robert. 2016. Vanuatu Parliamen-
tary Snap Election 2016: Some Additional 
Tables of Results. Manuscript in author’s 
files.
Leadership Code Act. 2006. Vanuatu 
political reviews • melanesia 373
Consolidated Legislation. Available from 
Pacific Islands Legal Information Institute:  
http://www.paclii.org
Naupa, Anna. 2016. Vanuatu Election 
Outcome: Can a New Coalition Govern-
ment Kick-Start the Economy? The Inter-
preter, 2 Feb. https://www.lowyinstitute
.org/the-interpreter/contributors/articles/ 
anna-naupa [accessed 11 April 2017]
Republic of Vanuatu. 2016. Publication 
of Results and Declaration of Candidates 
Elected for the 2016 Snap Election, Order 
No 9 of 2016. Official Gazette: Extraordi-
nary Gazette 11 (1 Feb). Port Vila.
Van Trease, Howard. 2005. The Opera-
tion of the Single Non-Transferable Voting 
System in Vanuatu. Journal of Common-
wealth and Comparative Politics 43 (3): 
296–332.
_______. 2016. Melanesia in Review: 
Issues and Events 2015: Vanuatu. 
The Contemporary Pacific 28:773–788.
Vanuatu Daily Digest. News blog. 
 vanuatudaily.wordpress.com/Category/ 
the-news-digested/
vdp, Vanuatu Daily Post. Newspaper. 
Port Vila.
vuca, Court of Appeal of Vanuatu. 2016. 
Civil Appeal Case 2180 of 2016 (22 July): 
Kalosil v Republic of Vanuatu [2016] 
vuca 35. Available from Pacific Islands 
Legal Information Institute: http://www 
.paclii.org.
vusc, Supreme Court of the Republic 
of Vanuatu. Available from Pacific  
Islands Legal Information Institute:  
http://www.paclii.org. 
———. 2015. Criminal Case 762 of 2015 
(7 Dec): Public Prosecutor v Kalosil [2015] 
vusc 173.
_______. 2016a. Criminal Case 138 of 
2016 (23 Aug): Public Prosecutor v Pipite 
[2016] vusc 100.
_______. 2016b. Criminal Case 138 of 
2016 (29 Sept): Public Prosecutor v Pipite 
[2016] vusc 133.
_______. 2016c. Constitutional Case 1850 
of 2016 (11 Nov): Kalosil v Republic of 
Vanuatu [2016] vusc 150.
